Saturday, June 7, 2014

Keynes on Nominal Wage Flexibility

At the conclusion of Chapter 19 of the The General Theory, after showing how nominal wage flexibility is unlikely to be a reliable general solution to involuntary unemployment, Keynes noted how such nominal wage flexibility would also likely lead to further economic problems:
“It follows, therefore, that if labour were to respond to conditions of gradually diminishing employment by offering its services at a gradually diminishing money-wage, this would not, as a rule, have the effect of reducing real wages and might even have the effect of increasing them, through its adverse influence on the volume of output. The chief result of this policy would be to cause a great instability of prices, so violent perhaps as to make business calculations futile in an economic society functioning after the manner of that in which we live. To suppose that a flexible wage policy is a right and proper adjunct of a system which on the whole is one of laissez-faire, is the opposite of the truth. It is only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed that a flexible wage policy could function with success.” (Keynes 1964 [1936]: 269).
Was there ever a golden age of flexible wages in the modern economic history?

Empirical data on the US seems to show that nominal wage cuts appear common enough in the pre-1914 era (Hanes and James 2003: 1417–1418), but nevertheless other data shows that a strong degree of nominal wage rigidity already developed by the late 19th century, and industrial workers seem to have vehemently opposed money wage cuts even by the 1880s (Hanes 1993). It seems clear that significant social and institutional changes affecting how wages are set have occurred since the 19th century.

Much the same thing can be said about prices. Prices appear to be more flexible in the 19th century, but the reasons for this are probably that (1) mark-up/administered prices were less prevalent than in the modern world, and (2) as argued by John Hicks there may have been important institutional changes in Western economies from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries.

To expand on point (2), Hicks postulated that by the early 20th century the role of wholesale merchants and dealer-wholesalers had declined to a great extent: in the 19th century, such wholesale merchants had enabled a much higher degree of price flexibility, but their decline and the rise of large industrial enterprises (which tended to fix prices on the basis of costs) caused strong downward price rigidities to emerge. The increasing downwards inflexibility of nominal wages will have contributed to this.

So did the 19th century economy function in the way predicted by neoclassical theory? That is, did it have a strong and rapid tendency to full employment brought about by price and wage flexibility clearing markets?

Even with a much higher degree of price and wage flexibility than today, there are many reasons to think that it did not, since there were persistent and severe economic problems in both Europe and America in the 1870s and 1890s, a period of business pessimism and “profit deflation” in the long deflation of 1873 to 1896, recurrent financial crises, and strong evidence that debt deflation was a crippling difficulty for certain classes of people.

Moreover, involuntary unemployment was clearly a serious problem in the 1870s and 1890s, and for various reasons it may well be that the best estimates available today are actually serious underestimates of the 19th century unemployment rate.

All in all, the neoclassical view of how markets function seems highly dubious, even for the 19th century.

Further Reading
19th Century Economic History.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hanes, Christopher. 1993. “The Development of Nominal Wage Rigidity in the Late 19th Century,” The American Economic Review 83.4: 732–756.

Hanes, Christopher and John A. James. 2003. “Wage Adjustment under Low Inflation: Evidence from U.S. History,” The American Economic Review 93.4: 1414–1424.

Keynes, J. M. 1964 [1936]. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Harvest/HBJ Book, New York and London.

7 comments:

  1. Of course, YOU would tend to believe Lebergott's estimates over Vernon's. Even with the notions there not being a social security apparatus and a welfare state, this may not be entirely accurate. I'm suspicious of James and Thomas, arguments, mobility across the united states, was high the frontier was still uncolonized, (do you count cowboys, and subsistence farmers and hunters for gold in Alaska as employed or unemployed?) and I am sure small towns full of farmers were not adequately surveyed to the degree that the cities might have been We know that farmers suffered during the depression years and free silver might have helped, but isn't it equally possible that the United States growth in the 188s was vastly understated, that Kuznets was partially right. and so was Vernon?

    Besides, what settles the deal for me is total u.s. economic output when world war I ended, It had surpassed Britain, France, Germany, Russia and other countries as well. The United States in the 19th century. played the role that China plays now to it in the 21century, it was catching up FAST to the U.K.

    Laissez Faire, with moderate protectionism, (tariffs were raised and lowered periodically, and remember the united states had no income tax! neither did it subsidize exports, it ran a trade deficit) made the U.S. grow into an economic superpower, and Britain dominated the Victorian era under that system of organization, in which a central government spends around 10% of its country's gdp, labor markets are free. (no slavery)
    Laissez faire with the added caveat of demand management would have been even better

    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. You appear to have forgotten that the US was one of the most protectionist nations in the world in the 19th century. Furthermore, it is likely that with better macroeconomic management (e.g., a central bank, more public investment, stimulus to overcome recessions, etc.), the US could have had far better economic growth and more stability in the 19th century.

      Also, Germany industrialised rapidly in the late 19th century with a high degree of state intervention.

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    2. "neither did it subsidize exports, it ran a trade deficit"

      According to this it mostly ran a trade surplus, when you include shipping/ freight services:

      http://www.nber.org/papers/w4710.pdf?new_window=1

      (see page 10)

      Delete
  2. "You appear to have forgotten that the US was one of the most protectionist nations in the world in the 19th century."
    Is this REALLY
    true? You have to look at more things than just tariffs. There were no export subsidies and no income tax. Government spending as a percentage of the economy was especially low. The U.S. did NOT develop the "Asian" way, by exporting to more developed countries, it always had a strong consumer base. It had a strong persistent capital account surplus that funded its trade deficit.

    "Furthermore, it is likely that with better macroeconomic management (e.g., a central bank, more public investment, stimulus to overcome recessions, etc.), the US could have had far better economic growth and more stability in the 19th century."

    Didn't I just say that?

    "Also, Germany industrialised rapidly in the late 19th century with a high degree of state intervention."

    I don't deny this, but u.s. economic output surpassed Germany's.


    ReplyDelete
    Replies
    1. (1) ""You appear to have forgotten that the US was one of the most protectionist nations in the world in the 19th century."
      Is this REALLY true?"


      Yes, it is. See P. Bairoch, 1993. Economics and World History: Myths and Paradoxes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. pp. 32-38 and 52-53.

      (2) the US developed strong manufacturing to supply its domestic population precisely because of infant industry protectionism.

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    2. "It had a strong persistent capital account surplus that funded its trade deficit."

      According to this it mostly ran a trade surplus through the 19th century:

      http://www.nber.org/papers/w4710

      But the current account was mostly in deficit until 1879 due to foreign interest payments, after that the current account was in surplus.

      http://gregmankiw.blogspot.co.uk/2006/07/current-acccount-vs-trade-deficit.html

      Delete
  3. You should look into the depression after the 1837 crash. It was quite severe with unemployment rates similar to those seen in the 1930s. I don't know why its rarely mentioned and understudied, to be honest. I think it is strong evidence against the idea that flexible wages promote full employment.

    http://www.ebhsoc.org/journal/index.php/journal/article/viewFile/244/237

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic_of_1837

    ReplyDelete